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1. INTRODUCTION
In the latter half of the twentieth century, there has been an
increasing awareness of the need for environmental protection on
a global scale and, at the same time, a recognition that interna-
tional trade liberalization policies may be at odds with environ-
mental protection. This interplay between the growing interna-
tional economic interdependency and the demands for environ-
mental protection has been the subject of much commentary.
Although the general consensus is that both global environmental
protection and increasing international trade mobility are worthy
goals, there is little agreement on how nations can simultaneously
achieve these two objectives.
Environmentalists are concerned that any weakening of
environmental standards, particularly in the United States, will
* Visiting Associate Professor, Legal Studies Department, the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Philip
Nichols of the Wharton School for his valuable suggestions and comments. I
also would like to thank Maisha Goss for her assistance and suggestions.
1 See, e.g., Geza Feketekuty, The Link Between Trade and Environmental
Policy, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 171 (1993) (asserting that the link between
trade and environmental policy has become an issue of heightened public
interest); Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade
Debate: Trade, Labor, and the Environment, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 61
(1996) (noting that environmental issues are playing a greater role in interna-
tional trade conflicts); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992)
(analyzing conflicts between trade liberalization and environmental protection);
Winfried Lang, Is the Protection of the Environment a Challenge to the
International Trading System, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 463 (1995)
(examining issues concerning trade and the environment); Richard B. Stewart,
EnvironmentalRegulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039
(1993) (examining the contemporary debate between trade and environmental
policy).
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result in overall environmental degradation. Industries, on the
other hand, view strict environmental standards as a means to
stymie international competition.2 This debate is even more
pronounced in emerging economies. These countries are almost
always hostile to any linkage between international trade and
environmental policy.' Both international trade policy and
environmental groups have begun to focus on the issue.4 In
response to this tension between environmental and free trade
concerns, there has been an increasing movement for the harmoni-
zation of environmental regulation.' Although harmonization
may be a good idea in theory, it still has not solved the problem
of weakening standards in the industrial nations and raising
standards in the developing nations to such a level that companies
cannot afford to comply.
6
In response to this problem, on September 1, 1996, the
International Standards Organization ("ISO") approved the
voluntary international environmental standards, ISO 140017 and
14004.8 These standards provide a means for companies to
manage their environmental programs and performance. These
2 See Simon S. C. Tay, Asians Must Learn To Play the Green Game, Bus.
TIMES, June 14, 1996, at 12 (arguing against uniform environmental require-
ments, he states, '[a] green mask may hide the hard face of economic self-
interest").
' See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade
Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 377 1994).
' The environment played a significant role in the negotiations for the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 11, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M.
1085 (1993) [hereinafter CITES] examines trade measures as a way to enforce
treaty obligations. See Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade
Measures, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 25-29 (1993).
s "All nations and producers have a basic common interest in harmonizing
their product regulations in order to reduce transaction costs, efforts at
disguised protectionism, and other trade barriers resulting from differences in
national standards." Stewart, supra note 1, at 2044.
6 See id.; see also Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GAT , U.S. Law,
and the Environment: A Proposal To Amend GA 77 in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin
Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2098, 2131-33 (1992) (pointing out the difficulty
of reconciling NAFTA and GATT with high U.S. environmental standards).
' ISO 14001: Environmental Management Systems, International Standards
Organization 4ISO), ISO 14001:1996(E) (Sept. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ISO 14001].
' ISO 14004: Environmental Management Systems, International Standards
Organization 4ISO), ISO 14004:1996(E) (Sept. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ISO 14004].
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first two standards can guide companies to develop or improve an
environmental management system ("EMS") that can be used in
conjunction with other management systems to achieve the
economic and environmental goals of the organization.9 Al-
though these two environmental management standards were the
only ones in the 14000 series which gained approval, there are
others at various stages of development. These include standards
on environmental auditing, performance evaluation, eco-labeling,
and life-cycle analysis.'
The standards enable an organization to establish procedures
that set environmental policy and goals, to conform to them, and
to demonstrate the conformance to the organization's stake-
holders. As the introduction to the standards states, "[t]he overall
aim... is to support environmental protection and prevention of
pollution in balance with socio-economic needs.""
Although the goals of the standards are quite laudable, they are
not without their critics. One of the most widely-voiced concerns
is that countries will use the standards as non-tariff trade barri-
ers. 2 This is somewhat ironic, because one of the primary
motivating factors in developing the standards was to eliminate
non-tariff trade barriers. The rationale was that an international
standard would solve the problems created by the inconsistency
of a myriad of national and regional environmental regulations.
Because the standards are procedural and not substantive, they do
not set product or process regulation. As a result, there is no
problem of creating regulations that are nonattainable for
developing countries and unprotective for industrial countries.
Therefore, the standards will not interfere with the free flow of
goods from country to country. The standards specifically state
that they are "not intended to be used to create non-tariff barriers
or to increase or change an organization's legal obligations."13
Despite this claim, many developing countries continue to fear
that implementation of the standards will lead to trade barriers
rather than improved market competitiveness. Although the
" See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
'0 See Ronald Begley, Is ISO 14000 Worth It?, J. Bus. STRATEGY, Sept. 19,
1996, at 50.
n ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
12 See discussion infra Section 3.
13 ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
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standards are voluntary, there is apprehension that certification to
the standards will become de facto mandatory as organizations or
countries require ISO certification for entrance into their
markets. 14  Developing countries are concerned that larger
industrial countries will use the standards to exclude them from
their markets in the interest of the latter's domestic economy.
They cite to the U.S. labor unions' advocacy of NAFTA's side
agreement with Mexico as an example of this disingenuousness.15
Section 2 of this Article will evaluate the complex relationship
between the ISO standards and international trade. Specifically,
Section 3 will examine the standards' interaction with GATT
1994/WTO Agreement ("GATT 1994") and its Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement").16 The TBT
Agreement creates a preference for international standards and
mandates that standards must not be "more trade restrictive than
necessary" to meet the stated regulatory objective.17 The Agree-
ment recognizes that environmental protection is a "legitimate
objective" that may justify certain regulations that result in trade
restrictions." Currently, no nation has adopted the ISO stan-
dards as law, and therefore, arguably, a country cannot challenge
it under the TBT Agreement. Some countries, however, are
either strongly encouraging or considering mandatory implementa-
tion of the standards.19 In either case, the question then becomes
14 See David J. Freeman & Gregory R. Belcamino, Protecting the Confidenti-
ality oflSO 14000 Audit Reports, N.Y. L.J., June 12, 1995, at S4 (stating that a
number of large companies have indicated they will require ISO 14000
certification of suppliers and customers).
15 See Tay, supra note 2. Also cited as an example of trade barriers
disguised as environmental regulation is the "case of Asean tropical timber
[where] there was no corresponding control over products from temperate
forests which also contribute to environment degradation." Id.
16 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1428 (2d Sess. 1994) [hereinafter TBT
Agreement].
17 Id. art. 2.2.
is Id.
19 Currently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is
considering a number of options that involve ISO 14000. One proposal is to
require ISO 14000 certification as a prerequisite for entrance into certain
regulatory reform pilot programs such as Project XL. See CSI, Leadership
Programs at EPA May Use ISO 14000 Management Standards, Official Says, 26
Env't Rep. 257, 258 (BNA) (May 26, 1995) ("A business' adherence to ISO
14000 may provide a basis for EPA recognition of a firm's ability to attain
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whether the ISO standards are too restrictive to pass muster under
the agreement. Section 4 will argue that the standards are not too
restrictive, notwithstanding potential challenges to the standards
as non-tariff trade barriers under GATT 1994.
Even if the standards remain voluntary and are not an issue
under GATT 1994, there is a problem that they could be used as
de facto trade barriers. If ISO 14000 squeezes out a significant
number of countries from the global market, the standards will
not truly further their stated goal of creating viable international
environmental standards. Rather, ISO 14000 should operate as a
means of encouraging environmental improvement in poorer
developing countries by enabling them to compete effectively in
the global economy. If the standards, even inadvertently, have the
effect of creating substantial trade barriers for developing nations,
then the standards need to be reevaluated.
ISO 14000 has the potential, as an international environmental
standard, to help resolve the problem of transboundary environ-
mental risk and to improve the global economy. In order to
reach this potential, changes may need to be incorporated in the
standards as well as in international trade agreements.
2. ISO 14000
2.1. Background and Influences on ISO 14000
There has been increasing awareness, in the United States as
well as abroad, that a more global approach to environmental
protection is necessary to safeguard the earth's precious resourc-
es.2' In 1993, the Geneva-based International Standards Organi-
zation 21 began developing universal standards for environmental
compliance with environmental regulations .... ") (quoting Mary McKiel,
EPA's standards network director)).
In addition, the Colombian government may require ISO 14000 certifica-
tion as a precondition to allowing a company to search for oil. See Kara Sissell,
Survey: High Regard for ISO 14000, CHEM. WK. Nov. 8, 1995, at 42.
20 The international community recognized the vast scope of environmental
problems at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Agenda 21, a non-
binding agreement reached at the Summit, catalogs the wide variety of
environmental problems facing the world today. See THE EARTH SUMMIT
(UNCED) 125 (Stanley P. Johnson ed., 1993).
21 The ISO is a non-governmental organization established in 1947 "to
promote the development of standardization and related activities in the world
with a view to facilitating the international exchange of goods and services, and
19971
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management systems. The ISO patterned these standards after
ISO 9000 Standards on Quality Management' and designed them
to promote continuous environmental improvement.' The ISO
created a technical committee, TC 207, to draft global guidelines
that would function for both small and multinational companies
despite wide differences in environmental statutes and regula-
tions. 24 In February 1995, TC 207 released its draft guidelines -
ISO 14000: Guide to Environmental Management Principles,
Systems, and Supporting Techniques. 25 TC 207 also composed
another draft standard, ISO 14001, as the specifications for the
development of Environmental Management Systems.26 Dele-
gates from over fifty countries met in Oslo in June 1995 and
to developing cooperation in the spheres of intellectual, scientific, technological
and economic activity." What is I5O? (visited Mar. 25, 1997) < http://www.iso.
ch/infoe/intro.html >. Today, approximately 90 countries participate in ISO's
standard development. See id.
' ISO 9000: Quality Management and Quality Assurance Standards,
International Standards Organization (ISO), ISO 9000-1:1994(E) (1994)
[hereinafter ISO 9000].
' "ISO 14000 will stimulate new approaches to materials selection, product
and process design, and transportation fogistics at each step of the product life
cycle. These approaches will lead to overall reductions in environmental
burdens, as well as the development of economics-driven reverse distribution
systems that reclaim recyclable components at the end of a product's service
life .... ISO 14000 will also create a market-driven framework for balancing
environmental protection with socioeconomic needs and will foster the
concepts embodied in sustainable development and natural economics." Robert
B. Biggs & Glenn K. Nestel, ISO 14000: Proactive Building Blocksfor Achieving
GlobalSustainable Development (visited Mar. 25, 1997) < http://www.rfweston.
com/sd/iso.htm >.
24 See Christopher L. Bell & James L. Connaughton, New Global Standards
May Guide Industry on Environmental Issues: European Nations Are Leading the
Effort To Develop the Guidelines, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at S2. ISO is an
international standard-setting organization composed of organizations from over
100 countries. Approximately 60 countries participated in the drafting of the
14000 standards. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is the U.S.
representative to ISO. U.S. companies participate in the draft procedure
through membership in ANSI and participation on ANSI-sponsored subcom-
mittees. See Freeman & Belcamino, supra note 14, at S4.
25 ISO 14000: Guide to Environmental Management Principles, Systems, and
Supporting Techniques, International Standards Organization (ISO), ISO
14000:199X, (Feb. 1995) (committee draft). See Kenneth A. Freeling,
Implementing an Environmental Management System in Accordance with the
ISO's Draft Standards Is Not Necessarily Costly and Could Yield Benefits As Well,
NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1995, at B5.
26 See ISO 14001, supra note 7.
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approved both the 14000 and 14001 draft standards? At that
time, however, they renamed draft standard 14000 to ISO
14004.28 In March 1996, members of TC 207 met in London and
approved the current draft?.2  TC 207 fully approved the draft
standards as ISO standards in September 1996.3"
The ISO 14000 Environmental Management System is a stark
departure from the U.S. public-law approach to environmental
regulation. Instead of using a punishment-based command and
control system to delegate enforcement power to governmental
agencies and the states, the ISO approach is voluntary.3' The
ISO allows an individual company to set the benchmark of
environmental performance, with the minimum standard at the
current regulatory level, and permits competition to drive
continued improvement.32 One should note, however, that the
standards "were not designed to be a cure-all for environmental
problems." 33 This system, if successfully implemented, will
encourage companies to go beyond the minimal environmental
standards set by an individual country and compete successfully
on an international playing field.
27 See Freeman & Belcamino, supra note 14, at S4.
28 See i. Hereinafter, "ISO 14000" will refer to the ISO 14000 series,
which include ISO 14001 and ISO 14004.
29 In addition to ISO 14001 and 14004, three standards concerning
environmental auditing are also expected for approval - ISO 14010 (Guidelines
for Environmental Auditing - General Principles), ISO 14011 (Guidelines for
Environmental Auditing-Audit Procedures - Auditing of Environmental
Management Systems), and ISO 14012 (Guidelines for Environmental Auditing
-- Qualification Criteria for Environmental Auditors). See Helga Tilton, The
Dawn of ISO 14000: The New Environmental Management System Sparks
Considerable Interest, but There Is Relatively Little Action Among Domestic
Players, CHEM. MKT. REP., Apr. 8, 1996, at SR5.
" See Suzan L. Jackson, ISO 14000: What You Need To Know About the
New Environmental Standards, ENVTL. LABORATORY WASH. REP., Feb. 6,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
"i See Lynn Johannson, Voluntary Standards at the Dawn of ISO 14000: Fit
or, Folly for TQEM?, in AuDITING FOR ENviRONMENTAL QuALiT LEADER-
SHI-P aoh2 T. Willig ed., 1995) 97.
32 See id.
EPA Official, Attorney Attempt To Clarify Purpose of Upcoming
International Standards, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2375 (Apr. 19, 1996) (quoting
Mary McKiel, EPA coordinator of the ISO 14000 program).
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2.1.1. Environmental Management Systems and the
Development of ISO 9000
Since the mid-1980s, there has been increasing interest in
encouraging companies to adopt voluntarily environmental
management systems as a way to self-police environmental
compliance and encourage improvement.-' These systems exceed
the typical environmental compliance assessments that many
companies have been routinely undertaking since the 1970s."s A
successful environmental management system is more concerned
with a company's total and continued involvement in its
environmental performance than with isolated efforts. The
system "focuses the organization's efforts to establish reliable,
affordable, and consistent approaches to environmental protection
that engage all employees in the enterprise. The environmental
protection system becomes part of the total management system,
receiving the same attention as quality, personnel, cost control,
maintenance, and production functions."36 The goals of ISO
14000 are to unify international standards that lessen the impact
of country-specific regulations and to create a system that will lead
SFor example, in 1988 the Chemical Manufacturers Association ado ted
the Responsible Care code of environmental conduct. Over 90% othe
chemical manufacturers represented by the Chemical Manufacturers Association
have committed to the Responsible Care code. See Michael S. Baram,
Multinational Corporations, Private Codes, and Technology Transfer for Sustain-
able Development, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA) 33, 47-49 (1994).
" Environmental compliance auditing merely assesses whether a company
is in current compliance with environmental regulation that affects the
company's processes and products. Companies do not have to undergo
compliance audits regularly. Moreover, the audits do not guarantee continued
compliance or continued environmental improvement. See ISO 14001, supra
note 7, at v. The American Society of Testing and Materials ("ASTM") has
developed a draft standard for environmental compliance auditing as well as a
standard for an environmental management system audit. Both are specifically
designed for U.S. companies, but will be compatible with international
standards adopted by ISO. See William P. Gulledge, Environmental Auditing
and the New ASTM Standards: A Useful Management Tool or an Enforcement
Time Bomb?, in AUDITING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP 79,
81 (John T. Willig ed., 1995).
36 Joe Cascio, The Forum: ISO 14001 Thy Will Be Used - For Good Reason,
ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 38 ("Reliability is achieved through
continual awareness and competence of all employees, rather than from
extraordinary or isolated efforts of specialists.").
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to meaningful environmental improvement on a global scale.37
In 1992, the British Standards Institute ("BSI") created British
Standard 7750 ("BS 7750"),38 which is designed to assist any type
of company in establishing a viable environmental management
system. 39 Also in 1992, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro
adopted the international compact entitled Agenda 21, which
encourages business and industry "[rto adopt and report on the
implementation of codes of conduct promoting best environmen-
tal practice . . . ."40 Soon thereafter, in 1993, the European
Union established a voluntary environmental management and
auditing system, the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
("EMIAS") .41 The stated purpose of EMAS is "to promote
continuous improvements in the environmental performance of
industrial activities."42 Generally, EMAS requires periodic audits,
external verifiers, an environmental management system, and a
publicly-filed environmental impact report.43 As a result of these
government-sponsored initiatives, as well as business-supported
proposals,' in 1992, ISO began exploring the possibility of
" See Marc E. Gold, ISO 14000: A New Global Business Benchmark, ENVTL.
COMPLIANcE & LIG. STRATEGY, May 1995, at 1. ("Ideally ISO 14000 will
level the international environmental playing field by establishing a uniform set
of voluntary environmental standards that will be the norm for international
trade.").
31 See BRIAN ROTHERY, BS 7750: IMPLEMENTING THE ENVIRONMENT
MANAGEMENT STANDARD AND THE EC ECO-MANAGEMENT SCHEME 11-12
(1993).
39 See id.
40 Agenda 21, S 30.10, in THE EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 20, at 430.
41 Council Regulation 1836/93 on Allowing Voluntary Participation by
Companies in the Industrial Sector in a Community Eco-Management and
Audit Scheme, 1993 Oj. (L 168) 1 [hereinafter Council Reg. 1836/93].
42 Id. at 2. A detailed discussion of EMAS is beyond the scope of this
paper. For a complete overview of EMAS and a recommendation for the
development of an American EMAS, see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental
Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995).
" See Council Reg. 1836/93, supra note 41, at 3.
44 In 1991, the Business Council for Sustainable Development suggested
creating international environmental standards to allow businesses to measure
environmental impact and then take steps to improve it. In 1989, the Valdez
Principles were published as a guide to socially responsible investors. Corpora-
tions that agreed to the Principles were to minimize pollutants and wastes,
publish annually a self-audit of environmental impact, and establish an
environmental management system. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point
of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardizations and Global
Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 ECOLoGY L.Q. 479, 497-98
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developing an international environmental standard that would
not be industry or country specific.45 The success of ISO 9000,
the international quality control standards, led to optimism that
similar techniques could be used to develop an environmental
management standard.46
ISO 9000, published in 1987, established guidelines for
companies to use when they create quality assurance systems for
themselves and their suppliers.47 ISO 9000 attempted to stan-
dardize quality assurance systems in order to facilitate internation-
al trade.48 Instead of creating a uniform international standard,
ISO 9000 produced guidelines for companies to establish quality
control systems for the life cycle of particular processes or
products. One aspect of ISO 9000 that foreshadowed the
development of the 14000 series is the requirement that a
company offer products or services that comply with societal
statutes and regulations, including environmental rules. 49
Another aspect of ISO 9000 that has been incorporated into 14000
is the use of regular internal audits as well as outside verifica-
tion." The widespread success of ISO 9000 registration, especial-
ly in Europe, led to much optimism that nations would embrace
an international environmental standard as well."6 The hope is
that ISO 14000 certification will replicate the experience of ISO
(1995).
41 See id. at 499.
46 See id. at 499-500.
47 See id. at 499.
41 See PERRY L. JOHNSON, ISO 9000: MEETING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS 32-33 (1993).
49 See ISO 9004: Quality Management and Quality System Elements, § 0.1,
International Standards Organization (ISO), ISO 9004-1:1994(E) (1994)
[hereinafter ISO 9004]. These requirements include "obligations resulting from
laws, regulations, rules, codes, statutes and other considerations... includ[ing]
notably protection of the environment, health, safety, security, conservation of
energy and natural resources." Id. § 3.3.
10 See id. § 5.4-5.5.
si See Geoff House, Raising a Green Standard, INDUSTRY WK., July 17,
1995, at 73 (noting that ISO 14000 is moving toward acceptance similar to ISO
9000). However, ISO 9000 is not without its critics, particularly in the United
States. U.S. companies complained about the necessity of an independent
certifier because no accredited certifiers existed at that time in the United States
and the EU would only accept its own certifiers. See JOHNSON, supra note 48,
at 147. These criticisms have also carried over to ISO 14000. See infra Section
2.2.2.1.
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9000 by producing a domino effect of certification as more and
more companies decide to certify themselves and also require
certification of their suppliers.52 Unfortunately, this hope is also
a major concern of many of the companies in developing
nations. 3 They fear that a certification requirement will serve
as a de facto permit for entrance into global markets, thereby
barring companies who cannot afford the certification costs from
international trade 4
2.1.2. TC 207
As a result of these initiatives and the Earth Summit in Rio,
ISO formed the Strategic Advisory Group on Environment
("SAGE") in 1992 to determine the feasibility of an international
environmental management standard using BS 7750, EMAS, and
ISO 9000 as guidance.55 After much study and the production
of the initial draft documents, SAGE recommended that ISO form
a technical committee ("TC 207") to produce "consensus"
standards.5 6 In 1993, TC 207 began to establish environmental
standards in five areas: management systems, audits, labeling,
environmental performance evaluation, and life cycle assess-
ment.57
Not surprisingly, European nations represent, by far, the
largest presence in TC 207.5 They advocated the rapid develop-
ment of an ISO standard that would be consistent with BS 7750
and EMAS 9 The United States, Canada, as well as the Pacific
Rim countries also had significant influence in TC 207.'
In June 1995, TC 207 met in Oslo and approved a draft
international environmental management standard - ISO 14001,
the actual management system, and ISO 14000, the guidelines on
52 See Johannson, supra note 31, at 93, 102.
5 See International Standards: ISO 14000 Group Says More Work Needed in
Acceptance, Certification Areas, 133 Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) D-10 (July 11,
1996) [hereinafter International Standards].
s4 See id.
" See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 501.
56 See Christopher L. Bell & James L. Connaughton, International
Environmental Standards, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 39, 40 (1995).
17 See id. at 4041.
58 See id,
59 See id.
60 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 526-27.
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principles, systems, and supporting techniques.6 1  The draft
documents were to be circulated to member countries for at least
six months before voting on its final adoption.62 The other sub-
committees are still working on the consensus draft documents,
which may not be ready for circulation for several years.63 In
March 1996, the members of TC 207 met in London and
approved the draft documents."4 TC 207 made available the
finalized version of the documents during the summer of 1996,65
and members approved it in September 1996.66
2.2. ISO 14000 Specifics
The standards set forth in ISO 14000 are guidelines that will
enable any company in the world, irrespective of size, type,
geography, or social or cultural diversity, to develop a quality
environmental management system ("EMS"). 67 The aim of the
standards are to "support environmental protection and preven-
tion of pollution in balance with socio-economic needs."
68 ISO
14001 sets forth general standards for a basic EMS system.
69 ISO
14004, Environmental Management Systems - Specifications with
Guidance for Use, is a "how-to" manual for companies to follow
in the actual implementation process. 70 Both standards assist
organizations to enhance environmental performance through the
development of an EMS that has company-wide support. As the
introduction to the 14001 standards states:
61 See Joe Kirwin, Draft ISO Management Standard Approved; To Be
Circulated then Possibly Adopted, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (July 6, 1995),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
62 See id.
63 See id.
6' See Tilton, supra note 29, at SR5.
65 See id.
6 See id.
67 See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See ISO 14004, supra note 8, 0.1, at v ("This international standard
considers the elements of an EMS and provides practical advice on implement-
ing or enhancing such a system. It also provides organizations with advice on
how to effectively initiate, improve or sustain an environmental management
system.").
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[International environmental management standards] are
intended to provide organizations with the elements of an
effective environmental management system which can be
integrated with other management requirements, to assist
organizations to achieve environmental and economic
goals. These Standards, like other International Standards,
[should not be] used to create non-tariff trade barriers or
to increase or change an organization's legal obliga-
tions.71
The 14000 standards involve developing an EMS that is part
of the company's overall management structure, with top-level
managerial commitment that extends to the entire company and
all of its products. 72 The EMS attempts to manage more effec-
tively a company's environmental performance.7 3 The continu-
al-improvement goal, however, has met with some hostility,
particularly from industrial nations with strict environmental
statutes.7 4 Another controversial aspect of the standards is that
they do not set any particular level of environmental performance,
but simply require that companies have an environmental
management program in place.75 The ultimate responsibility for
the development and oversight of the environmental management
71 ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
72 See ISO 14004, supra note 8, S 0.2, at vii. See also Johannson, supra note
31 ("The standard will require companies to be concerned with everything from
incoming raw material, through to the final product - a cradle-to-grave
approach.").
" See ISO 14004, supra note 8, § 0.2, at vii ("An organization should
implement an effective environmental management system in order to help
protect human health and the environment from the potential impacts of its
activities, products or services; and to assist in maintaining and improving the
quality of the environment.").
74 See Kirwin, supra note 61 ("The way it reads now there is no floor of
where a company should start. So there could be continual improvement but
from a very ow level and that does not translate to an improvement on the
actual environment." (quoting Pierre Hauselmann, policy advisor of the World
Wildlife Federation)). See also infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text
(discussing the disagreement between the United States and the EU with respect
to including a mandatory environmental improvement requirement in the
standards).
's See Freeling, supra note 25, at B5.
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system rests in the hands of top management, not the environ-
mental compliance officer or division. 6 Thus, the guidelines do
not dictate a company's environmental compliance levels; the
individual country's statutes and regulations perform that task.
The guidelines are simply a set of tools to enable management to
reach the goal of improved performance.'
The standards specifically list the benefits that a company can
reap by creating an EMS. These include: assuring customers of
commitment to demonstrable environmental management;
maintaining good public/community relations; satisfying investor
criteria and improving access to capital; obtaining insurance at
reasonable cost; enhancing image and market share; meeting
vendor-certification criteria; improving cost control; reducing
incidents that result in liability; demonstrating reasonable care;
conserving input materials and energy; facilitating the pursuit of
permits and authorizations; fostering development and sharing of
environmental solutions; and improving industry-government
relations.78
2.2.1. Principles for a Successful EMS
The standards do recognize, however, that the adoption of an
EMS does not necessarily lead to optimal environmental perfor-
mance; the level and availability of environmental technology will
also have a large impact on the success of any environmental
system. 9 With this caveat in mind, the guidelines identify five
principles that are the bedrock of any quality EMS. They consist
of: commitment and policy; planning; implementation; measure-
ment and evaluation; and review and implementation."
The first of the five general principles calls for senior manage-
ment to create and commit to the company's environmental
policy. Top management must make sure that the policy: is
appropriate for the nature of the corporation's activities; includes
a commitment to pollution prevention and continued improve-
ment of the policy; includes a commitment to compliance with
76 See id.
77 See id. ("The draft standards are not intended directly to control the
impact of a company's operations on the environment.").
78 See ISO 14004, supra note 8, 5 0.2, at vii.
71 See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at vi.
80 See ISO 14004, supra note 8, S 4, at 3.
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environmental statutes and regulations; provides a framework for
setting and reviewing environmental objectives; is communicated
to all employees; and is available to the public." After develop-
ing such a policy, senior management must continually monitor
and refine the policy to ensure its success.
Once the environmental policy is in place, the second
principle requires the organization to formulate a plan to
implement the environmental policy. This process includes
identification of environmental aspects and their related impact;
identification of legal regulatory requirements relevant to its
activities, products, or services; establishment of internal perfor-
mance requirements; and creation of environmental objectives and
targets.8 2 Of course, the initial step in formulating an implemen-
tation plan is to identify the prior or potential impacts that an
organization's activities have on the environment. This involves
making legal, environmental, and health and safety risk assess-
ments.83  This planning process must also establish specific
environmental goals or "targets" and a time frame to meet each
si See id. S 4.1, at 4-7. The standards list the following issues for
consideration in establishing an environmental policy: (1) Does the organiza-
tion have an environmental policy? (2) Does the policy reflect the organiza-
tion's values? (3) Has the environmental policy been approved by the Board
of Directors or other governing body, and has someone been identified and
been given the authority to oversee and implement the policy? (4) Does the
policy drive the setting of environmental objectives and targets? (5) Does the
policy guide the organization towards monitoring the best available technology
and management practices? (6) Does the policy support continual improve-
ment? (7) Does the policy state the organization's commitment to monitor
performance, to meet or exceed legal requirements, and to consider the
expectations of its interested parties? See id. 4.1.4, at 6.
82 See id. S 4.2.1, at 7.
83 See id. S 4.2.2, at 7-9. Other important issues include: (1) identifying the
environmental aspects of the organization's activities, products, and services;
(2) determining if the organization's activities, products, or services create any
significant adverse environmental impacts; (3) identifying the organization's
procedure for evaluating the environmental impacts of new projects; (4)
determining whether the location of the organization requires special
environmental consideration (e.g., sensitive environmental areas); (5) determin-
ing the effects of any intended changes or additions to activities, products, or
services to environmental aspects and their associated impacts; (6) assessing the
severity of the impact on the environment should a potential process fail; (7)
determining the frequency with which the situation will arise that could lead
to the impact; and (8) determining the scope - local, regional, or global - of
the significant environmental impacts. See id. at 8.
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target.8 4
The third principle of the ISO 14000 Guidelines is implemen-
tation, which includes ensuring that there are appropriate
resources - human, physical, and financial - available to
implement the policy, as well as integrating the EMS into the
existing managerial structure." This necessitates assigning overall
responsibility for the program to a senior person or group with
sufficient authority and resources, in addition to building
awareness and motivation throughout the organization. 6
Although senior management must oversee implementation of the
standards, all employees have a duty to assure environmental
performance within the scope of their job responsibilities. 7
The organization must consider the environmental impacts of
its operations and activities and minimize those impacts through
the development or modification of operational procedures. 8
This should include the establishment of a communication
network, both internal and external to the organization, that
reports on the environmental activities and performance of the
organization. 9 Finally, the organization needs to develop an
emergency preparedness and response plan to deal with unexpect-
ed environmental accidents or emergencies.'
The fourth principle requires the organization to establish a
system for measuring and monitoring ongoing environmental
4 See id. § 4.2.5, at 11-12. The company should also include the
environmental management program as part of the organization's strategic plan
and should revise it regularl,. ee id. § 4.2.6, at 12-13.
11 See id. 4.3, at 13.
86 See id. 4.3.2.3, at 15.
87 See id.
11 See id. 4.3.3.3, at 20. Operational control activities can be divided into
three categories. One involves the prevention of pollution and conservation of
resources in new capital projects, process changes and resources management,
prop erty (acquisitions, divestitures, and management), and new products and
packaging. Another activity is the daily management that ensures conformance
with and efficient effectiveness of internal and external organizational require-
ments. The third activity is strategic management - anticipating and
responding to changing environmental requirements. See id.
89 This communication process demonstrates the organization's commit-
ment to the environment and raises awareness of the organization's environ-
mental policies and objectives. See id. § 4.3.3.1, at 18.
90 See id. S 4.3.3.4, at 20-21. The emergency plan should include details of
emergency services, a communication plan, a response plan to different kinds
of emergencies, and training plans. See id.
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performance. 91 This system will not only evaluate compliance
with environmental statutes and legislation, but will also measure
the overall progress toward the organization's environmental goals
and policies.92 The system requires periodic auditing of the EMS
by an objective, impartial, and properly-trained auditor, but does
not require external verifiers. 93
The fifth and final principle of the guidelines is the develop-
ment of a review process to achieve improvement of overall
environmental performance.94 Management should conduct the
review at regular intervals to assess the environmental targets and
objectives, determine the effectiveness of the EMS program, and
make the necessary changes or adjustments. 95
2.2.2. The Guidelines and Disagreements
The guidelines in its current form are the result of a compro-
mise primarily between the U.S. delegation to TC 207 and the
European delegation.96 The disagreements between these two
factions are a consequence of the legal realities facing each
faction.9' The U.S. command and control system is much more
punitive than the EU's EMAS, leading the U.S. faction to want
less substantive, more procedural, positions. The Europeans, on
the other hand, favor a clear commitment to continual improve-
91 See id. S 4.4.2, at 21-22.
92 See id.
9' See id. § 4.4.5, at 22. The lack of a reqirement of external auditors
could be a weakness in this system, particularly if the internal auditor does not
have autonomy.
91 See id. § 4.5, at 23. "The continual improvement process should:
identify areas of opportunity for improvement of the environmental manage-
ment system which lead to improved environmental performance; determine
the root cause or causes of nonconformances or deficiencies; develop and
implement a plan of corrective and preventive action to address root causes;
verify the effectiveness of the corrective and preventive actions; document any
changes in procedures resulting from process improvement; and make
comparisons with objectives and targets." Id. S 4.5.3, at 24.
" See id. § 4.5.2, at 23. Adjustments may be necessary because of changes
in legislation and/or products or activities of the organization; information
revealed in the audit; advances in technology; lessons learned from environmen-
tal incidents; and changes in expectations and/or requirements of interested par-
ties. See id.
96 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 504-07.
97 See id. at 504.
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ment and more open, public access to the EMS."
Generally, the United States prevailed in the several areas of
disagreement between the two factions. One of the biggest areas
of disagreement involved environmental performance improve-
ment. The European faction wanted to ensure that the standard
would also meet the requirements of EMAS, which requires
continual improvement, but also lists specific areas for monitoring
and improvement. 99 The U.S. faction favored a more flexible
approach, without mandatory improvements.?° Although the
ISO standard does call for a commitment to continual improve-
ment, the annex to ISO 14001 recognizes that
[a]though some improvement in environmental perfor-
mance can be expected due to the adoption of a systematic
approach, it should be understood that the [EMS] is a tool
which enables the organization to achieve and systematical-
ly control the level of environmental performance that it
sets itself. The establishment and operation of an environ-
mental management system will not, in itself, necessarily
result in an immediate reduction of adverse environmental
impact.
101
The European and U.S. delegations also disagreed over
whether the standard would require a specific standard of
pollution control technology. The U.S. delegation worried that
this would lead to extensive new liability in the United States if
the stated standard exceeded the current regulatory norm. 0 2 As
a result of the U.S. objection, the guidelines specify no specific
level of technology, but state that "the environmental management
system should encourage organizations to consider implementation
of the best available technology, where appropriate and where
98 See id.
" See Council Reg. 1836/93, supra note 41, art. 3. The areas listed for
continual improvement include: energy, water, and resource use; waste
avoidance; recycling; waste transport and disposal; new processes and changes
to existing ones; and environmental performance of subcontractors and
suppliers. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 505.
" See Council Reg. 1836/93, supra note 41, art. 3.
101 ISO 14001, supra note 7, § A.1, at 6.
102 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 506.
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economically viable. In addition, the cost effectiveness of such
technology should be fully taken into account."103
The two factions also conflicted over the proposed incorpora-
tion of a BS 7750 requirement that the organization maintain an
"environmental effects register" to document the direct and
indirect effects of the organization's activities, products or
services.' 4 The U.S. delegation balked at the inclusion of the
effects register for fear that such a document would be readily
discovered by regulators or interested third parties and would be
a blueprint for litigation.15 Once again, the U.S. point of view
prevailed: the guidelines contain no reference to an environmen-
tal effects register, but merely refer to the development of a
procedure for determining the effects of the organization's
activities.' °6
As the above discussion indicates, the EU and U.S. countries
took the most active role in the actual drafting process. Although
all countries were welcome and encouraged to send representatives
to the technical committees, less developed nations were underrep-
resented in the drafting process." This lack of participation
may jeopardize the widespread adoption of the standards in
developing countries in the future.0 As one commentator has
proposed, the ISO Secretariat in Geneva should create a fund to
help finance the attendance of less developed countries and small
o ISO 14001, supra note 7, at vi-vii.
104 See ROTHERY, supra note 38, at 51.
105 The fear of information discovered by an organization as a result of
voluntary self-audits is the primary reason for most U.S. companies' objections
to environmental management and auditing systems. See Eric W. Orts & Paula
C. Murray, Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege" The Right Bal-
ance for Self-Evaluative EnvironmentalAudits, 1 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997)
(draft version) (arguing for a limited privilege).
106 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 506-07. See also ISO 14001 S 4.3.1
("The organization shall establish and maintain a procedure to identify the
environmental aspects of its activities, products or services that it can control
.. in order to determine those which have or can have significant impacts on
the environment.").
107 There are several reasons for the lack of representation by developing
nations. One is the cost to attend the meetings, which were held in places
around the world such as Norway, South Africa, and France. Although the
meetings were moved in an effort to maximize participation, developing nations
were not well represented. Another possible reason for their lack of
participation is their contemplation that they would be out-voted by industrial
powers. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 525-27.
"I See id. at 527.
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businesses at the meetings." 9
Another important concern, particularly for small and mid-size
companies, is the cost of ISO certification. Currently, estimates
of the cost of implementing an ISO 14000 range from $8,000 to
$100,000 depending on the size of the company and whether the
company has previously certified to ISO 9000.110 These esti-
mates do not include the costs of implementation of new or
improved systems and programs that might be needed as a result
of the certification process.
2.2.2.1. Third-Party Certification
Perhaps the biggest controversy involved in the adoption of
the draft standards is the third-party certification issue. Although
there is nothing in the ISO documents that requires third-party
certification, the key to the effectiveness of ISO 14000 in the
global marketplace is the genuineness of the certification of
companies that comply with the standards. In order to ensure the
quality and conformity of the environmental management systems
developed under the auspices of ISO 14000, some sort of verifica-
tion procedure is necessary. The use of third-party verifiers is
based in part on ISO 9000 and on EMAS, both of which require
the use of outside auditors."' Many U.S. organizations objected
to the imposition of the third-party verification. As one group
stated:
A problem with third-party certification is that no formal,
international infrastructure for accreditation currently
governs the development, operation, and harmonization of
ISO 14000 third-party certification programs. Instead,
109 See id. at 528.
110 See, e.g., Catherine Fahy, Eco-Tech Standards in Horizon, MASS HIGH
TECH, June 26, 1995, at 1 (estimating the cost of implementation to be from
$8,000 to $25,000); Geoff House, supra note 51, at 73 (Experts believe ISO
14000 certification will cost from '/a to the cost of registering under ISO
9000, averaging between $50,000 and $100,000 with small organizations spend-
ing as little as $10,000 to $15,000.); Tilton, supra note 29, at SR5 (Small to
medium size firms could expend $50,000 to $100,000 or more, and fees for
maintaining certification could run about $25,000 per facility.).
... See Environmental Management ISO 14000: An Overview, LEGAL
ANALYSIS & REGULATIONS (Manufacturers Alliance), Apr. 1995, at iii [here-
inafter ISO 14000 Overview]; Council Reg. 1836/93, supra note 41, at 4-5.
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these third-party programs are generally developed by
private accreditation organizations, in which industry's
interest are underrepresented. Thus, there is not sufficient
industry input.1
Certainly, from the point of view of developing countries,
third-party certification would be another major obstacle to
certification. Very few companies in developing countries would
have ready access to independent auditors. Moreover, available
auditors might face suspicion in industrial countries if they were
not accredited by an international accreditation program.
Another objection to third-party certification is the high cost.
In particular, smaller countries and firms in the developing nations
view third-party certification as adding yet another substantial cost
to an already expensive venture."' Because of this additional
burden, developing nations opposed the third-party certification
requirement."' The United States also opposed a mandatory
third-party certification in the final draft of ISO 14000, because of
its approach to environmental regulation and its fears of increased
liability."'
2.2.2.2. Self-Certification
The U.S. objections to the certification requirement led to the
approval of the "self-certification" concept 6 in the draft docu-
ments.117  The choice of whether to employ self-certification or
third-party certification may depend on the company's market.
112 ISO 14000 Overview, supra note 111, at 3.
113 In testimony before the House Science Subcommittee on Technology,
a product safety manager for Caterpillar Inc. stated that third-party certification
was of questionable value, and "if bodies that engage in third-party certification
excessively hype the benefits of third-party evaluation and organizations are
gullible to such hype, ISO 14000 could [add] cost with little initial value."
Third-Party Certification for ISO 14000 Meets Objections from Industry Witnesses,
27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 445 (June 14, 1996).
114 Under one estimate, third-party certification drives up the cost of an
ISO 9000 certification by 20%. See Joe Cascio, International Environmental
Management Standards: ISO 9000's Less Tractable Siblings, STANDARDIZATION
NEWS (AST", Apr. 1994, at 44, 45.
115 See id.
116 Clearly, self-certification raises reliability issues with respect to the
validity and objectivity of the entire verification process.
17 See Freeman & Belcamino, supra note 14, at S4, S14.
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If a company does extensive business in Europe, third-party
certification may be demanded as a course of doing business.'
As one manager for Illinois-based Caterpillar Inc. has stated, "[i]f
having a certification is going to mean something as we conduct
business around the world, then we'll go ahead and do it."" 9
The bottom line is that market forces will be the most important
factor in an organization's decision as to whether or not to get
third-party certification. If a company's commercial customers
and suppliers demand it, then the company will have to look
closely at the costs and benefits of such a certification and whether
self-certification will satisfy those parties. 20
From the perspective of developing nations the self-certifying
provision may, at first glance, appear to be a good idea. Howev-
er, this provision is not a panacea. In the global market, particu-
larly in dealing with industrial companies, self- certification may
not even be an option; industrial companies may instead demand
third-party certification. Thus, the self-certification option should
be removed from the ISO standards. Notwithstanding the fact
that the standards are procedural rather than substantive, they are
of little value if there is no reliable verifying process. If, however,
outside verifiers regularly audit the EMS and make the audit
available to the public, then trading partners and suppliers can be
assured that the company is striving for environmental excellence.
The self-certification issue and the procedural nature of ISO
14000 has led to fears, particularly among environmental groups,
that ISO 14000 will have little or no effect on actual environmen-
tal compliance or pollution prevention.12 As ISO proponents
acknowledge, the guidelines do not specify a uniform standard of
environmental compliance. Rather, the company must simply
certify that it is in compliance with local environmental statutes
and regulations. As one critic points out, an ISO 14000 audit is
not a compliance audit, but an audit of the procedures and
systems set up in the EMS." The worst-case scenario is that a
118 See Bell & Connaughton, supra note 24, at S2.
119 Paul Merrion, 14000 Ways To Play Safe, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Apr. 15,
1996, at 15.
120 See Bell & Connaughton, supra note 24, at S2.
121 See Gareth Porter, Little Effect on Environmental Performance, 12
ENVTL. FORUM 43 (Nov.-Dec. 1995 .
122 See id. at 44 ("Having a 'system in place for compliance' does not
necessarily lead to complying with environmental regulations.").
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company will have the procedures and system in place, but will
actually change very little with respect to environmental compli-
ance or improvement. 23
Nonetheless, it is the very procedural nature of the ISO 14000
standards that will bridge the tension between international trade
and environmental protection. The standards may not be perfect,
but they are set, and companies are starting to become certi-
fied.124 There is little doubt that agreement could be reached on
a substantive international environmental standard. Yet, with the
ISO standards, the certifying companies are aware that a trading
partner or supplier's certification is based on the local regula-
tions.' 25 As industrial nations and environmental groups contin-
ue to put pressure on developing nations to increase environmen-
tal protection,1 26 ISO 14000 may be the best hope to raise the
bar against environmental protection in these nations.
The ISO 14000 environmental management guidelines are
voluntary standards that organizations can choose to follow or
not.V If the standards are widely adopted, then their influence
over U.S. and global environmental policy could be immense.
Both business and environmental groups have expressed concern
over different aspects of the standard; for example, the rate of
improvement, the level of detail of the EMS, the extent of
documentation, and the resources devoted to the process will be
left up to the individual organization.1 28 This discretion coupled
with the reliability problems of self-certification may lead to
doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the certification,
particularly with regard to smaller companies or companies in the
developing nations. These companies may not have nor want to
commit scarce resources to the development of an extremely
detailed EMS even if they want or need ISO 14000 certification.
123 One author recommends incorporating a cleaner production audit into
the ISO framework. "Cleaner production audits, by tracking quantitatively all
inputs and outputs at each stage of the manufacturing process, reveal
inefficiencies and opportunities for saving money while reducing pollution." Id.
124 See Bell & Connaughton, supra note 24, at S2.
12 See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at 4.
126 See Daniel P. Blank, Note, Target-Based Environmental Trade Measures:
A Proposal for the New WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN.
ENvTL. L. J. 61, 63 (1996).
127 See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
12 See ISO 14000 Overview, supra note 111, at 2-5.
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Yet, with a few changes in the standards, most notably, not
allowing self-certification, the guidelines could advance interna-
tional environmental policy and not be overly trade restrictive.
Section 3 of the article will relate concerns of companies in the
developing nations. Their main concern is that ISO 14000 may
be used as a barrier to keep them out of global markets, and thus
defeat the very purpose of the standards - to improve environ-
mental quality on a global scale.
3. ISO 14000 - A NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIER?
While U.S. companies have raised many concerns about the
potential impact of the standards,129 the greatest concern among
developing nations is the fear that widespread adoption of the
standards will lead to non-tariff trade barriers. 130  These coun-
tries believe that companies in the more developed nations will
not only adopt the standards themselves, but will also require
certification of their trading partners. 131 The poorer companies
fear that they will be excluded from the global market, because
they cannot afford the expense of certification.13 ' No country
wants to create, albeit unintentionally, a system that fails to assist
developing nations in achieving overall environmental improve-
ment, thus further widening the gap of environmental perfor-
mance between the more developed countries and the less
developed areas. The key is to create a balance between the
interests of free international trade and transboundary environ-
mental improvement.
The tension between environmental protection and free
international trade is not new. In the past decades, the global
129 The basic U.S. concern involves the confidentiality of the documenta-
tion generated by the standards. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
See generally Orts & Murray, supra note 105 (proposing "elf-evaluative"
practices as a solution to the confidentiality debate-.
130 See International Standards, supra note 53, at D-10 (Thailand and other
Asian countries raise fears that ISO 14000 "may be used as a barrier to imports
from poorer countries unable to meet the more stringent management
standards in the developed world.").
131 See id.
132 But see Dominic Nathan, First Companies To Get ISO 14000 Certification,
STRAiTS TIMES (Singapore), June 27, 1996, at 44 (describing Singapore's
encouragement of its companies to certify to ISO 14000 in order not to be
locked out of world markets by making grants available to cover up to 70% of
the cost of certification).
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environment has ascended to the world stage demanding immedi-
ate and long range attention. "Free traders," however, fear that
environmental regulation is merely another form of protectionism
that will undermine the economic welfare of millions, particularly
in developing nations. 3 Such tension has become the source of
much unwarranted hostility, because both groups have similar
goals - improving the quality of life, both economically and
environmentally, for the entire globe.1 4 Undoubtedly, environ-
mental protection will result in trade barriers. The difficulty lies
in balancing meaningful environmental restrictions with the
increasing "international economic interdependence" that necessi-
tates open international markets.135 ISO 14000 is uniquely
suited to be a means to reach both goals.
3.1. Non-Tariff Trade Barriers ("NTBs) and GATT 1994
After the stock market crash of 1929, the United States and
most countries tried to gain economic advantage by instituting
rather substantial trade barriers in the forms of tariffs or quotas
on imports.1 36  As the world economy deteriorated, individual
countries increased trade restrictions in an effort to shore up their
domestic economy. This resulted in retaliatory tariff increases
aggravating the situation.1 37  The developed nations finally
realized that only through lowering the trade barriers could
"3 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1228 ("Trade liberalization is important for
enhancing world economic welfare and for providing a greater opportunity for
billions of individuals to lead satisfying lives. Measures that restrict trade often
will decrease the achievement of this goal.").
134 See id. ("Indeed, there is some evidence that environmental policy and
trade policy are complementary, at least in the sense that increasing world
welfare can lead to citizen demands and governmental actions to improve
protection for the environment.").
135 See id. at 1228-29 ("Such interdependence increases trade in both
products and services across national borders and brings many benefits to
participating countries.").
136 See Bradley Larson, Introduction to Non-Tariff Barriers to International
Trade, 7 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 155 (1986).
137 For example, the United States, in 1930, enacted the Smoot Hartley
tariff bill in an effort to give domestic industry an advantage over foreign
competition. The bill raised tariffs by an average of 52%. As a result, U.S.
trading partners retaliated by raising their tariffs. See DANIEL C. ESTY,
GREENING THE GATT 243 (1994).
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individual nations and the world economy become viable
again.'38 In 1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ment Act,139 giving the President the authority to enter into
negotiations and trade agreements. The Act gave U.S. negotiators
the authority to try to reach agreements on tariff reduction as
well as on intentional or unintentional restrictions on imports by
means other than a tariff.' 4 Thus, the term non-tariff trade
barrier was born.
1 41
Despite the granting of authority to enter into such agree-
ments, no serious effort took place until after World War II.
Great Britain and the United States, along with other Allied
countries, began to focus on the creation of international institu-
tions to manage global economic relations. 42 At the Breton
Woods Conference in 1944, the Allied leaders agreed to create an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"
or "World Bank") and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
to help finance postwar reconstruction.'43 They also agreed on
the need for an international structure to promote international
trade.' 44
The United States, in December of 1945, proposed the creation
of an International Trade Organization ("ITO") to liberalize
international trade. 45 Unfortunately, many countries, including
the United States, were wary of free trade. 46 The ITO proposal
agreed upon in Havana in 1947 ("the Havana Charter") was
therefore less trade liberalizing than the one envisioned at the
Breton Woods Conference. At the Havana Conference the
delegates approved an interim measure that committed the
participants to basic principles of international trade. 47  Unlike
138 See JOHN T. CUDDINGTON & RONALD I. MCKINNON, Free Trade
Versus Protectionism: A Perspective, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS, AND TRADE 3, 14
(1979).
139 Ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934), amending Tariff Act of 1930, Ch. 497, 46
Stat. 590 (1930).
140 See § 350, 48 Stat. at 943-44.
141 See Larson, supra note 136, at 156.
142 See CUDDINGTON & MCKINNON, supra note 138, at 7, 10.
143 See ESTY, supra note 137, at 244.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
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the ITO, the interim measure, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("General Agreement"), did not require ratification. 48
The United States' acceptance of the General Agreement was
an executive action that did not require congressional approv-
al.149 The agreement was intended as a temporary measure until
approval of the ITO."'° The ITO, however, was never ap-
proved. The Truman administration withdrew the ITO proposal
in 1950.151 Without U.S. support the ITO died.1 52  Although
GATT was never meant to be the primary international trade
institution, that is what it became. Nevertheless, GATT did not
include enforcement mechanisms nor an administrative struc-
ture.5 3 The U.S. Congress has never approved the General
Agreement. 154
3.1.1. Levelling the Playing Field: Principles of GATT
The General Agreement 5 is built on two basic principles.
The first is "most favored nation" status."5 6 This principle does
not mean that one country favors another in trading, but rather
that all countries following the General Agreement treat each
other equally."5 The second principle is the concept of national
treatment - once a product is imported into a country, that
product must be treated as a domestic product. 5 These two
148 See id.
149 See id. at 245.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See ESTY, supra note 137, at 245.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 While the agreement is a complex set of documents that includes 38
articles, the basic underlying premise is "nondiscrimination - or more simply,
do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Id.
"' See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.I.A.S., No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 188, art. I [hereinafter GATT] ("[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncondition-
ally to the like product originating or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.").
157 See Seymour Rubin, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 221, 222 (1980-81).
151 "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin.. . ." GATT,
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basic principles were intended to level the playing field of
international trade among the contracting parties to the General
Agreement. 5 9
Under the General Agreement, levelling the playing field
means liberalizing international trade in order to increase the
"comparative advantage" of each individual country.' The
motive behind this is that if every country is operating efficiently
then the world economy is better off. 6' Thus, the trading rules
under the General Agreement are designed to decrease governmen-
tal interference with international trade. Unfortunately, there are
certain types of governmental rules (i.e., environmental regula-
tions) that conflict with the goal of trade liberalization. As one
commentator has stated, "[i]t is this 'policy discord' that raises
the difficult question of how to accommodate the competing
values of trade liberalization on the one hand, and environmental
protection on the other, without undermining the basic principles
of both policy sets." 62
3.1.2. Non-Tariff Trade Barriers: Agreements on
Technical Barriers to Trade
While the initial trade and tariff negotiations under the
supra note 156, art. 111(2). See also Philip M. Nichols, GATTDoctrine, 36 VA.
J. INT'L L. 379, 386 (1996) ("National treatment means that once a good has
entered a country, it cannot be treated less favorably than similar domestic
goods, especially with regard to internal taxes and regulations.").
159 See ESTY, supra note 137, at 246.
160 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 1231. "The notion of comparative
advantage relates partly to the theories of economies of scale. When nations
specialize, they become more efficient in producing a product and possibly also
a service). If they can trade their products or services for the different products
or services that other countries specialize in producing, then all parties involved
will be better off because countries will not waste resources producing products
that other countries can produce more efficiently." Id.
161 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 2042 ("Trade advances global welfare by
promoting specialization in accordance with comparative advantage, expanding
opportunities to realize scale economies, tightening the discipline of competi-
tion, and stimulating wide dissemination of knowledge and technological
innovation.").
162 Jackson, supra note 1, at 1232.
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General Agreement focused on tariff reductions,163 the focus
recently has turned to NTBs.164 Not surprisingly, as countries
reduced tariffs, they implemented greater use of NTBs. Virtually
any government action can be characterized as a NTB.165
In 1973, during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations ("MTN"), elimination of NTBs was a major focus of
discussion.166 Ultimately, this round produced a number of
"codes" that were special side agreements dealing with the
problem of NTBs.16 One of these, the "Agreement on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade" (the standards code), required that product
standards, certification systems, test methods, and labeling
processes be as unrestrictive to trade as possible.16' This code
also encouraged the establishment of international standards.169
The effort to restrict NTBs was taken even further with the
signing of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round in 1994.17° The
163 Under a process of "tariffication," a country could not impose a tariff
higher than the one it had agreed upon; this process was highly successful. See
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 115-31 (1989).
164 See Edward J. Ray, Changing Pattern of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs
and the Rise in Non-Tafiff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 301 (1987).
165 See id. at 305-06.
166 See D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GA 7T and Multilateral Treaty
Making: The Tokyo Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 56 (1983). The contracting
parties to the General Agreement have conducted eight of these multilateral
negotiating rounds in addition to the regular meetings of the contracting parties
and the meetings of the GATT Council (comprised of representatives of any
contracting party who wanted to participate and which met monthly to
conduct GATT business). The first five rounds, Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949),
Torquay (1950), Geneva (1956), and Dillon (1960-61) dealt with tariff reduction.
The next two, Kennedy (1962-67) and Tokyo dealt with NTBs. See Nichols,
supra note 158, at 390-91.
167 See JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND:
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 1-5
(1984).
161 The agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round were approved by
Congress in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 19 U.S.C. 5 1671(a) (1982).
The standards code is found at 19 U.S.C. § 2531-33 (1982): The Senate Finance
Committee Report stated "[t]he agreement does not restrict a nation's right to
adopt standards necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, the
environment, to ensure the quality of its exports or to prevent deceptive
practices." S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 149, reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 535.
169 See 19 U.S.C. 5 2532(2) (1982).
170 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
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Uruguay Round established the World Trade Organization
("WTO") as a formal institution, and ushered in a new era in
international trade relations."' As a result of the creation of the
WTO, the 1947 version of GATT ceased to exist. 72 An impor-
tant part of the WTO Agreement is the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).173
The TBT Agreement recognizes that environmental regulation
and protection will result in certain barriers to trade. However,
protection of the environment is a "legitimate objective" that
justifies the use of trade restrictive regulation. 74 The Agreement
further states that the use of these restrictive regulations may not
create any "unnecessary obstacles to international trade." 75 The
regulations must not be "more trade-restrictive than necessary" to
meet the standard's objective.17 6  The Agreement lists two
conditions of "legitimate" regulations. First, the regulation must
be "necessary" for the achievement of a "legitimate objective."
1r7
Although "legitimate objective" is not specifically defined in the
Agreement, Article 2.2 lists environmental protection; protection
of human, animal and plant health or safety; and prevention of
consumer deception as possible legitimate objectives.
17 8
Secondly, the regulations should correspond to international
standards.1 79  The TBT Agreement states, "[w]here technical
regulations are required and relevant international standards exist
or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). This
Act expanded and updated GATT 1947. The new version is called GATT
1994.
171 See id. at 1143. The WTO incorporated the GATT 1947 General
Agreement into its charter. In effect, the WTO absorbed GATT 1947.
17 The WTO's charter includes three trade agreements annexed to the
agreement. They are the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See Nichols, supra note 158, at 391.
173 See TBT Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2.4. This Agreement established
international standards and conforming assessment systems [to improve]
efficiency of production and facilitat[e] ... international trade." Id.
174 See id. art. 2.2.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 See id.
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relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regula-
tions."8 The Agreement allows for deviation from internation-
al standards when the standard is inappropriate for the achieve-
ment of the regulatory goal."' The burden of proof is on the
member to justify such a deviation.18 2 The Agreement's man-
date that the standards are "rebuttably presumed not to create...
unnecessary obstacle[s] to international trade"8 3 further encour-
ages the use of the standards. There are two exceptions to the
adoption of international standards: where the standard is
ineffective or inappropriate because of geographic or climatic
differences or technical problems;8 4 and where the standard is
below the level of protection currently mandated by the govern-
ment.
185
3.2. ISO 14000: A Step to an Emerging International Environ-
mental Policy
Thus, the TBT Agreement creates a clear preference for
international standards such as ISO 14000. However, the ISO
standards are not "technical regulations," as prescribed by the
agreement. They are, instead, procedural guidelines for establish-
ing environmental management systems. No government
currently mandates use of environmental management systems by
companies doing business in that country. 6 The ISO standards,
however, are a much less significant barrier to global trade than
the "technical" guidelines and should be more consonant with
international trade.
Now that the ISO 14000 environmental management standard
has been approved and the other standards - auditor qualifica-
180 Id. art. 2.4.
.81 The Agreement states, "except when such international standards or
relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment
[sic] of the legitimate objectives pursued, f6r instance because of fundamental
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems." Id.
82 See id. art. 2.5. The Agreement also provides that no Member may use
"technical regulations" in a discriminatory manner. See id. art. 2.1.
"8 Id. art. 2.5.
184 See id. art. 2.4.
185 See id.
186 Participation in the European Union's Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme is voluntary. See Council Reg. 1836/93, supra note 41, art. 1(1), at 1,
2.
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tions, eco-labeling, and life cycle assessment - are in various draft
stages, the question remains how these standards will interact with
GATT 1994/WTO. Because the ISO standards are voluntary,
they would not appear to conflict with GATT 1994. Certainly, a
conflict would arise if a government mandates use of the stan-
dards, as several have been contemplating. Nevertheless, even if
the standards are not governmentally mandated, if they are
strongly encouraged by, for example, U.S. EPA, as a precondition
into one of the new regulatory reduction pilot programs such as
Project XL or the Common Sense Initiative,1 7 then the stan-
dards may be viewed as NTBs. If these pilot programs are
incorporated into the U.S. environmental regulatory scheme, then
foreign companies unable to meet ISO 14000 certification could
be blocked from many U.S. markets.
Furthermore, because the standards are not substantive, there
is a lesser chance that they could be challenged under GATT. The
ISO 14000 standards are guidelines for companies to promulgate
procedures for assuring environmental performance and improve-
ment.188 Companies are not required to meet any international
product or process standard.189 As the introduction to ISO
14001 states "[t]hese standards . . .should not be used to create
non-tariff trade barriers or to increase or change an organization's
legal obligations."19 Thus, the voluntary nature of the stan-
dards, along with their non-substantive nature, are not likely to
lead to challenges to GATT 1994.
Presuming that the standards are not formally or informally
adopted by a government and that there is no formal GATT
challenge to them, the fact remains that they could have a
profound effect on the international economic community. Thus,
ISO 14000 should be used as a means to create the first step to a
transboundary environmental regulatory system that will
strengthen environmental protection with minimal interference to
global trade.
Developing nations historically have been suspicious of the
187 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
188 See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at v.
189 See id.
"9 See id. at 4.
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environmental motives of industrial countries.'91 They have
characterized the environmental trade measures of industrial
countries as "eco-imperialism," inhibiting the developing country
from using its domestic resources. 9"2 Malaysia's Minister of the
Environment, Rafidah Aziz, stated at the end of the Uruguay
Round that "environmental issues 'are now clearly being used to
promote protectionist motives, particularly to keep out imports
from countries which have a better competitive edge and compara-
tive advantage."'193 These countries view any restriction on
trade as a threat to an already precarious economy.
3.2.1. The Use of Trade Sanctions To Enforce
Environmental Policy
The U.S. attempt to protect dolphins from being slaughtered
in tuna fishing nets illustrates the tension between environmental
regulation and international free trade. In 1990, the Ninth Circuit
enjoined the importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico because
of the number of dolphins killed in Mexican nets. 194 The court
based its decision on provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act ("MMPA"). 195 When Mexico challenged the decision under
GATT 1947, a GATT dispute resolution panel found that the
U.S. ban violated Article III of the GATT's national treatment
requirement. 96 The panel found that the environmental exemp-
tions in Article XX (referring to protection of animal life and
health and conservation of natural resources) did not extend to
trade sanctions targeted at another country's policies. 197  Envi-
ronmentalists and U.S. legal scholars widely criticized the deci-
191 See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 459, 492 (1994).
192 See id.
193 Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Some North-South Consider-
ations, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 591, 593 (1994).
See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
195 See id.; The Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C)
(Supp. IV 1992).
96 See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991)
[hereinafter Tuna I]. For a more complete analysis of the decision, see Blank,
supra note 126, at 73-77.
197 See Tuna I, supra note 196, % 5.24-5.34.
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sion. 9 8 Nevertheless, most other countries, including develop-
ing nations, supported it.'99 Later, Mexico in a move to quell
opposition to NAFTA, decided not to pursue its GATT ac-
tion.20 As a consequence, the decision never became GATT
law under GATT 1947. The yellowfin tuna dispute clearly
illustrates the wide divide between the United States and develop-
ing nations regarding the use of trade sanctions to force environ-
mental protection.2°'
Since Tuna I, the conflict between free international trade and
environmental protection has come dramatically into focus. Many
proposals have been made as to how to reach a compromise.
After the Tuna I decision, the GATT Secretariat included a
twenty-eight page insert in its 1992 annual report concerning the
environment and trade.202 This report recommends abandoning
trade sanctions altogether as a means of affecting environmental
policy. The Secretariat favors negotiating multilateral environ-
mental agreements, or absent that, requesting a waiver from the
GATT rules to impose a trade sanction.203
198 See, e.g., Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental
Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 766 (1993) (callin& the decision
"unpersuasive and ... wrong"); William J. Snape, In & Naomi B. Lefkovitz,
Searching for GA T's Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting
"Due Process?", 27 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 777, 785 (1994) (calling the decision
"insidious").
199 See Blank, supra note 126, at 75; see also, Steve Charnovitz, Environ-
mental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD ECON. 335, 338 (1992)
(noting that the decision garnered the approval of delegates from 35 countries
at the 1992 GATT Council, while the U.S. position received no support).
200 See Charnovitz, supra note 199, at 338. There was also a second
tuna/dolphin GATT decision involving an embargo of tuna from the European
Union World Trade Organization. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, May 20, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna HI]. The panel also decided against the U.S.
ban. See id.
201 Indonesia submitted an interested party brief in support of Mexico in
Tuna I that stated "[t]he MMPA had been used as a means to ... shield United
States producers from import competition by exploiting public sympathy for
dolphins, which were in any event not a species listed as endangered under
CITES." Tuna I, supra note 200, S 4.15.
202 GATT, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE 19 (1990-91).
203 See id. at 22. The report states "if most of GATT's contracting parties
agree to participate in a particular multilateral environmental agreement, the
consistency of its trade provisions with GATT is not likely to be a problel
since there would be enough votes to secure a waiver [currently requiring a /S
vote of the parties]." Id. at 26.
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3.2.2. Considerations in Developing an International
Environmental Standard
Clearly, a multilateral environmental agreement ("MEA") is
one, and perhaps the best, solution to the transboundary environ-
mental problem. However, such an agreement may take years to
negotiate and may result in the lowest common denominator as
the standard - the "race to the bottom." 20" Yet, a number of
scholars have called for harmonization in environmental and labor
standards. Professor Richard Stewart states, "harmonization
would benefit consumers in all nations by eliminating differences
in environmental standards that undercut producers' ability to
achieve economies of scale, increase the transaction costs of
complying with different state regulations, and hinder trade and
its attendant benefits."0 5 While acknowledging the potential
benefits of harmonization, Stewart also points out the difficulties
in reaching any agreement on harmonization, in part, because of
the lack of economic and technical resources within developing
nations.2°6 Because of their urgent need for economic develop-
ment, citizens of developing nations place a lower value on
protecting the environment than those in developed countries. 207
Although some efforts have been made to provide financial
assistance for environmental protection in developing coun-
tries,208 financial assistance is not the answer. The money is
simply not there. More importantly, financial aid merely
increases dependence on industrial nations.2 Some commenta-
tors have proposed that industrial countries should link aid to
developing nations to a requirement that certain environmental
204 Stewart, supra note 1, at 2045-46.
205 Id. at 2098.
206 See id. at 2099.
207 See id.
208 Chapter 33 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development's (UNCED) Agenda 21 calls for foreign assistance to help
developing nations set up environmental regulatory systems. See UNCED,
Agenda 21, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26/Rev. 1 (1992). See also
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987), Art. 10, as amended, 30 I.L.M. 537, 550 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Montreal Protocol] (establishing the Multilateral Fund to provide technical
cooperation in order to improve the environment).
209 See Blank, supra note 126, at 91 (financial assistance increases dependency
on industrial nations and can undermine sovereignty).
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standards be met. This proposal, however, has been criticized as
a modern form of colonialism.21°
Without suggesting an abandonment of efforts to negotiate
international environmental standards, it is nevertheless worth
recognizing that the process will be slow and arduous. With
many nations involved, each with its own interests and agendas,
there is little likelihood that any MEA could be negotiated
successfully and quickly. Moreover, there is little guarantee that
the agreed-upon standards would not turn into a race to the
bottom in an effort to have global participation. In that event,
the United States and other industrial countries might withhold
their agreement in order to protect the dramatic environmental
strides made in the last thirty years.
Although there have been environmental agreements negotiat-
ed under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental
Programs ("UNEP") and the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development ("UNCED"),2" they are not the
equivalent of a comprehensive environmental transboundary
regulatory system. UNEP and UNCED should continue to strive
to negotiate MEAs and to encourage as many countries as
possible, particularly developing nations, to participate. ISO
14000 is perfectly suited to be the first step to developing a
meaningful transboundary environmental policy.
3.2.3. Advantages of Using ISO 14000 To Develop a
Meaningful International Environmental Policy
ISO 14000 has the advantage of being a voluntary standard,
not mandated for use by any government.212  In addition,
because the standards are not substantive, the standards avoid the
problem of a race to the bottom. Consequently, ISO 14000 not
only can avoid the race-to-the-bottom problem, but can actually
210 See Peggy A. Rodgers, Note, Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: The
World Bank af Environmental Accountability, 3 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV.
457, 476 (1990).
211 Agreements have been reached on endangered species, see, e.g., Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
[CITES], Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; hazardous waste
transport, see e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
657; and ozone depletion, see, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 208.
212 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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lead to a "race to the top." Those who believe that industries that
voluntarily adopt more stringent environmental standards will
benefit economically increasingly embrace this view.213  As
explained by Professor Stewart, the argument has two parts. First,
there will be an international movement toward more protective
environmental regulation, particularly to deal with global
problems such as climate change. 14 As countries develop more
stringent environmental regulations, industries must develop
processes and products that pollute less .2 " As Stewart states,
"[w]hen other nations eventually 'follow the leader' and adopt
similarly stringent requirements, the leader country's industry
will enjoy a dominant position in the growing international
market for 'green' technology. This is the 'race to the top."'
The second part of the argument is that these stringent
environmental regulations will stimulate innovation, promote
investment in more advanced pollution-prevention technologies,
and strengthen industrial competitiveness. Stewart recognizes
that these competitive benefits are probably insufficient to
convince a country to adopt more strict environmental regula-
tions.21  However, he maintains that, when coupled with other
innovation-promoting instruments, such as environmental
contracting 19 and market-based incentives,'o such competition
will lead to an improvement in environmental quality.21
ISO 14000 is the type of market-based incentive that can fuel
the race to the top. It can avoid GATT problems, because the
213 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 2080.
214 See id. Stewart attributes the first prong of the argument to the work
of Michael Porter in MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITvE ADVANTAGE
OF NATIONS 8 (1990).
211 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 2080.
216 Id. (footnote omitted).
217 See id. ("[N]ew technologies that meet high standards of environmental
performance tend to be highly resource efficient, resulting in economic benefits
in the form of lower production costs as well as environmental benefits."
(footnote omitted)).
218 See id. at 2082.
219 Environmental contracts are negotiated agreements between the
government and industry that set pollution reduction timetables in light of the
special needs and conditions of the industry or facility. See id. at 2090.
24' Four basic incentives are available: pollution taxes; transferable pollution
permits; deposit and return systems; and "green" marketing. See id. at 2093-94.
221 See id. at 2080-81.
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standards are not governmentally mandated. Yet, it is not
without teeth; the standards call for continual environmental
improvement.m The standards do not require harmonization
of environmental regulations; the certifying company merely
needs to comply with local regulations. m This should ease
initial fears of developing countries that they would be required
to meet the more stringent regulatory standard of an industrial
country.
ISO 14000 will also spur a "follow-the-leader" pattern. As
more and more companies certify to the standards, and in turn,
require certification from their suppliers and trading partners,
there can only be environmental improvement. Certainly, the
success of ISO 9000 and its ability to produce a domino effect of
certification of quality assurance z 4 inspires significant hope for
the same success of ISO 14000. While waiting for international
organizations such as UNCED to negotiate harmonized global
environmental standards, the private, voluntary measures of ISO
14000 can level the international trade playing field and lead to
environmental improvement.
3.2.4. Weaknesses of ISO 14000
ISO 14000, however, is not without weaknesses. It was drafted
as a compromise, and the drafters were not unsympathetic to the
concerns of less developed countries, including, the lack of
substantive standards.m Nevertheless, certain changes could be
made that would strengthen the standards. One potential change
is requiring outside, third-party certifiers. Although the develop-
ing nations objected to such a requirement on the basis of its high
cost,2 6 if the standards are to have any real meaning, third-party
certification must be required. Thus, the standards should be
amended to require outside verifiers. This requirement could be
phased in over several years to allow companies in developing
nations to make the financial commitment.
Another potential change would be to require some mecha-
nism for public disclosure of crucial environmental information,
22 See discussion supra section 2.2.
223 See ISO 14001, supra note 7, at 4.
4 See discussion supra section 2.1.
See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 44, at 504-05.
226 See supra notes 110, 113-14 and accompanying text.
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similar to the "environmental effects register" required by BS
7750.' This document would be available to interested parties.
In this way, suppliers and trading partners, as well as environmen-
tal groups, could determine actual environmental progress. TC
207 proposed this change in the draft stages of ISO 14000, but the
United States vehemently opposed it because of fear of increased
litigation and fines.28  The adoption of a limited privilege,
however, would likely alleviate this fear. 29  As in the case of
outside verifiers, if the standards are to be truly significant, there
must be a demonstrable commitment to environmental progress.
The more information is available on a global basis, the more
likely that real improvement will be made. The presence of
developing countries is vital during the future drafting process for
the other ISO 14000 standards, as well as modifications to the
current ones. Only this will guarantee true global participation.
4. CONCLUSION
Most of the dialogue concerning the tension between the
reduction of transboundary environmental risk and international
trade has focused exclusively on the role of government. ISO
14000 is a means of temporarily bypassing the governmental role
in favor of a private solution. This is not to say that governmen-
tal action is not important. Instead, the standards are a means of
taking the first steps toward harmonization while the governments
negotiate meaningful standards.
Even if the ISO standards do not technically run afoul of
GATT or any other international trade agreement, there can be
little doubt that the standards are a de facto trade barrier.
Environmental improvement on a global basis and truly "free"
trade are basically incompatible ideals. The standards, with some
modifications, will not be the mechanism of further skewing the
environmental quality between less developed countries and
industrial ones. Rather, they will bridge the gap, taking the first
step to a transboundary environmental policy.
See ROTHERY, supra note 38, at 51.
228 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
", See Orts & Murray, supra note 105, at 653.
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